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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Rigidity has been widely studied by many subdisciplines of psychology, including 
personality, social, cognitive, developmental, educational, neuropsychology, 
organizational behavior, psychopathology and psychotherapy (Shultz and Searleman, 
2002).  However, despite continued attention from researchers, a singular definition of 
the rigidity construct remains elusive.  Under the broad label of rigidity, researchers have 
defined their own focus, which has   included (but has not been limited to) muscular, 
perceptual, behavioral and attitudinal rigidity.  Most generally, a distinction has been 
made between two types of rigidity (see Shultz & Searleman, 2002, for a review): 
cognitive and behavioral.  The cognitive component of rigidity refers both to the 
formation of a mental set and to the perseveration of a mental set, which can represent 
beliefs, categories, attitudes, expectancies and schemas (Chown, 1959; Rokeach, 1948; 
Sarmany-Schuller, 1994; Schultz & Searleman, 2002; Stewin, 1983; Vollhardt, 1990).  
Behavioral rigidity involves the formation and perseveration of behavioral sets, which are 
patterns of observable responses.  The current study focused on cognitive, not behavioral, 
rigidity.     
 In social psychology, self-report questionnaires have traditionally been used to 
capture cognitive rigidity.  Two of these self-report measures involve openness and 
acceptance: the Openness to Experience dimension of the five-factor model of 
personality (McCrae, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1996) and the Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale (Budner, 1962).  Openness to Experience is a personality dimension that favors 
flexibility, cognitive complexity, and novelty, and intolerance of ambiguity measures 
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differences in desire for certainty (Durrheim, 1995).  However, these measures treat 
cognitive rigidity as a personality dimension; they focus on the association between 
individual temperament and cognitive rigidity/flexibility without exploring the 
underpinnings of the construct.     
   The emphasis of the current study was on the structural components of cognitive 
rigidity, and specifically the rigidity/flexibility of cognitive boundaries.  This focus is 
more similar to constructs represented in two self-report measures that have recently 
received much attention in social psychology: Need for Closure Scale (NFCS; 
Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) and Personal Need for Structure (PNS; Neuberg & 
Newsom, 1993).  Kruglanski et al.’s (1994) NFCS measures five subdimensions of 
preference for structure: discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, predictability and 
closed mindedness.  The NFCS is able to discriminate between “artistic” and 
“conventional” types.  PNS is an individual-difference measure that refers to the 
preference for simplicity and structure; high levels of PNS are associated with greater 
tendency to stereotype (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & 
O’Brien, 1995) and form less complex categories for objects (Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993).    
The current research focused on an outcome measure related to these cognitive 
rigidity constructs, specifically NFC and PNS, in its focus on structure and boundaries.  It 
differs from NFC and PNS in that it is a behavioral measure (i.e., a categorization task) 
rather than a self-report of rigidity.  However, it can be distinguished from other known 
behavioral rigidity tasks in psychology, because its focus is on forming mental sets, not 
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on maintaining or changing them (e.g., Wisconsin Cart Sort Task; Harris, 1998; Stroop 
Color-World Interference Task; Stroop, 1935).  
Approach/Avoidance Framework and Regulatory-Focus 
 Recently, new approaches to understand cognitive rigidity have employed a basic 
motivational distinction, approach versus avoidance, to identify how one’s motivation 
may affect cognitive processing and, specifically, rigidity.  Central to motivation theory 
and research is the distinction between approach (i.e. sensitive to positive outcomes) and 
avoidance (i.e. sensitive to  negative outcomes).  Many areas within psychology, from 
personality (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1996) to 
neuroscience (e.g., Gray, 1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997), provide abundant 
evidence for the distinction between approaching positive outcomes versus avoiding 
negative outcomes.  Work in neuroscience has identified independent motivational 
systems based on the response to signals of reward and punishment; in particular, a 
distinction has been made between a behavioral activation system (BAS) and a 
behavioral inhibition system (BIS] (e.g., Gray, 1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997), 
and Carver & his colleagues (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver & White, 1994) present the 
BIS and BAS as the two fundamental components of self-regulation. Though represented 
in various frames, the underlying characteristic of each distinction is essentially the same: 
an approach motivation is sensitive to positive outcomes and involves moving towards, 
activating and promoting, whereas an avoidance motivation is sensitive to negative 
outcomes and involves restraining and inhibiting. 
Similarly, Higgins’ (1997, 1998) theory of regulatory focus identifies two distinct 
forms of self-regulation: promotion, which focuses on the attainment of positive ends, 
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and prevention, which focuses on avoidance of negative ends.  Individuals in a promotion 
focus prefer eager approach strategies (i.e., global processing) and individuals in a 
prevention focus prefer vigilant avoidant strategies (i.e., local processing) (Förster & 
Higgins, 2005).  Interestingly, there is evidence that when individuals achieve regulatory 
fit, a match between the method by which people pursue a goal (approach/avoidance 
strategies) and their goal orientation (promotion/prevention focused), it enhances their 
motivational strength (Higgins, 2006; Förster & Higgins, 2005).  
Multiple areas of psychology have successfully applied the approach/avoidance 
distinction, including work on self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 
1997, 1998), achievement (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Elliot & Church, 1997; McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clarke, & Lowell, 1952), and interpersonal relations (e.g., Impett, Gable, & 
Peplau, 2005).  Recently, the approach/avoidance distinction has even been applied to 
morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp, 2008). These authors propose two types of 
morality, reflecting the two different motivational/self-regulatory systems.  The 
“proscriptive” system is motivationally based on avoidance, involving what we should 
not do (e.g., harm others), while the “prescriptive” system is motivationally based on 
approach, what we should do (e.g., help others).  This model addresses the fundamental 
difference between inhibiting “bad” behaviors versus activating “good” behaviors.  
Cognitive Rigidity and Approach/Avoidance Motivation 
Few researchers have explored the links between approach/avoidance distinctions 
and cognitive rigidity/flexibility.  In addition, the operationalization of cognitive 
rigidity/flexibility has varied from researcher to researcher.   However, overall the 
available empirical studies provide consistent support for a relationship between an 
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approach-based orientation and cognitive flexibility, and an avoidance-based orientation 
and cognitive rigidity.   
In attentional research, approach orientation has been shown to bolster attentional 
flexibility, while avoidance motives hamper task performance (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 
2005; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel & Denzler, 2006).  Some of these experiments primed 
approach and avoidance motives by tapping an individual’s automatic social–
physiological behaviors, whereby arm flexion primes the approach motive and arm 
extension primes the avoidance motive (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993).  
Enactment of approach, relative to avoidance behavior, expanded participants’ scope of 
conceptual attention by enhancing access to mental representations.  In addition 
enactment of approach behavior was associated with expanded conceptual attentional 
scope in the facilitation of generating alternative solutions for pre-solved anagrams. 
Mood research also supports the relationship between approach orientation and 
cognitive flexibility and avoidance orientation and cognitive rigidity.  Positive moods 
(e.g., analogous to approach) facilitate categorization in terms of greater category 
inclusion, whereas negative moods (e.g., analogous to avoidance) encourage greater 
category exclusion (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984).  Additionally, trait level anxiety is 
associated with more rigid grouping of semantic material.  More specifically, increases in 
trait level anxiety resulted in the rejection of more non-prototypic items from 
membership in a category, reliance on narrower categories, and decreased perception of 
relatedness and family resemblance between members from different categories 
(Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990).     
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In addition to attention and affect findings, research on language supports the 
relationship between approach and cognitive flexibility and avoidance and cognitive 
rigidity.  Semin and Fiedler (1988, 1989) discuss the difference in language use 
depending on approach-avoidance orientation; approach mode language tends to be more 
abstract, whereas avoidance mode language is more concrete.  An abstract focus suggests 
greater inclusivity, whereas a concrete focus is sensitive to error-reduction by focusing on 
detail, thereby making exclusivity more practical.  In this way, abstraction and 
concreteness are analogous to conceptualizations of cognitive flexibility and rigidity. 
Overall, then, an approach motive appears to produce a more “open” orientation 
to cognitive processing that allows for greater flexibility in forming mental sets.  In 
contrast, an avoidance motive seems to produce greater inhibition and the establishment 
of narrower, more rigid mental sets.   
Political Orientation 
Interestingly, understanding the links between approach/avoidance and cognitive 
rigidity may provide a better understanding of the association between conservatism and 
cognitive rigidity found in past research.  Empirical data supports the relationship 
between cognitive rigidity and political orientation, specifically conservatism, as 
discussed in Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway’s (2003) review paper.  Political 
conservatism is a complex and ubiquitous term that in the past has been conflated with 
other psychological constructs; yet literatures that discuss ideology, personality and 
individual-differences underscore an association between conservatism and cognitive 
rigidity. 
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According to Jost et al. (2003), the ideological belief system of political 
conservatism is related to motivational concerns associated with the psychological 
management of uncertainty and threat, which underlie the two core dimensions of 
conservatism, resistance to change and endorsement of inequality (Wilson, 1973; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Jost et al. (2003) posit that, “people adopt conservative 
ideologies in an effort to satisfy various social-cognitive motives,” including epistemic 
motives (p. 339), and they review research showing that these epistemic motives are 
associated with mental rigidity and closed-mindedness in political conservatives.  In 
particular, evidence for the association between conservatism and mental rigidity include: 
(a) conservatives’ greater dogmatism, which is indicative of closed-mindedness 
(Rokeach, 1960); (b) conservatives’ greater intolerance of ambiguity, which is 
characterized as leading people to cling to the familiar and as a personality variable that 
correlates positively with prejudice (e.g., Block & Block, 1950; Budner, 1962; Eysenck, 
1954; Feather, 1969; Sidanius, 1978, 1985);  (c) conservatives’ lower integrative 
complexity, suggesting fewer multiple perspectives and less high order integration of 
these components (e.g., Gruenfeld, 1995; Sidanius, 1984, 1985, 1988; Tetlock, 1983, 
1984); (d) conservatives’ decreased openness to experience (Wilson, 1973); (e) 
conservatives’ greater uncertainty avoidance, suggesting a preference for simple over 
complex stimuli, and familiar over unfamiliar stimuli (Wilson, 1973); (f) conservatives’ 
greater personal need for order and structure, indicating a heightened motivational need 
for order and structure (Webster & Steward, 1973; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1980); and 
(g) conservatives’ higher need for cognitive closure, which is associated with a 
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preference for the status quo and a  personal need for order and structure (Dittes, 1961; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).   
Cognitive rigidity may be related to a resistance to and fear of change, which are 
often considered central to conservative ideology; they are even reflected in self-
definitions by conservatives (see, e.g., Huntington, 1957).   Although some researchers 
(see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003) argue against resistance to change as part of conservative 
ideology, it is widely accepted that conservatives favor the status quo; “many changes 
desired by right-wingers are actually in the service of returning to previous idealized 
state” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 384).  Altemeyer’s (1996, 1998) Right Wing Authoritarianism 
Scale largely taps ideological commitment to tradition, authority, and social convention 
in the face of threats of change (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) and has been 
associated with conservatism.  It appears that political conservatives attempt to manage 
threat and uncertainty by seeking out the familiar and certain—that is, by relying on more 
constrained and for lack of a better word, conservative, patterns of thinking.        
Approach/Avoidance and Political Orientation 
Can the approach/avoidance distinction help us better understand the possible 
links between conservatism and cognitive rigidity?  Based on past literature, associations 
between political conservatism and mental rigidity are plentiful.  However, there is a lack 
of data that speaks to an underlying mechanism that can explain why and when 
conservatives might be more cognitively rigid than liberals.  Taken together, relevant 
theory and research suggests that management of uncertainty and threat are important 
factors underlying political conservatism, and an emphasis on negative outcomes such as 
uncertainty and threat suggests an association with avoidant (inhibiting and restraining) 
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strategies.  As noted above, avoidance motivation, which involves inhibition, results in 
greater cognitive rigidity.  Is political conservatism associated with avoidance (as 
opposed to approach) motivation?   
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci (in press) found support for this association.  
They proposed that conservatives are sensitive to negative outcomes, which leads to an 
avoidance motivational focus; liberals, on the other hand, are sensitive to positive 
outcomes and more apt to demonstrate an approach motivation.  In their research Janoff-
Bulman et al. (in press) found that conservatives favored avoidance-based moral motives 
(e.g., social order) and liberals showed a preference for approach-based moral motives 
(e.g., social justice).  Additionally, they found that contemporary social issues strongly 
endorsed by conservatives (e.g., anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage) reflect a proscriptive, 
inhibition-based morality (i.e., avoidance orientation), whereas contemporary social 
issues strongly endorsed by liberals (e.g., affirmative action, public welfare) reflect a 
prescriptive, activation-based morality (i.e., approach orientation).   Approach/avoidance 
motivation, then, may be the “missing” mechanism that can help explain the association 
between political conservatism and cognitive rigidity.   
Present Study 
  The present research attempted to explore the relationships among 
approach/avoidance regulatory systems, political orientation and cognitive rigidity.  To 
measure cognitive rigidity, we used a categorization task as a behavioral outcome 
measure.  We chose this approach because we believe it provides more valid information 
about cognitive rigidity than traditional self-report measures (e.g., Budner, 1962; 
Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; McCrae, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1996; Neuberg & 
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Newsom, 1993). The task involved categorizing object items representing three levels of 
prototypicality (e.g., prototypic, moderately prototypic and non-prototypic; Rosch, 1975).  
Participants provided goodness of fit ratings for each item, in addition to a discrete 
judgment of whether the item was considered a member of the category (i.e., “yes” or 
“no”). We operationalized cognitive rigidity as greater exclusion of ambiguous items 
from a given category (i.e., narrower categorization).   
We manipulated approach/avoidance orientation and investigated the effects of 
this motivational prime and political orientation on cognitive rigidity.  We manipulated 
approach/avoidance orientation using primes that focused individuals on what they 
should do (i.e., approach strategy) versus what they should not do (i.e., avoidance 
strategy).  For the priming task, we included two different approach/avoidance 
manipulations, one in the moral domain and the other in a non-moral domain.  Given that 
moral beliefs and values generally underlie political orientation, we were interested in 
whether inhibition in the moral domain in particular would produce greater rigidity (i.e., 
whether the moral avoidance prime would be more associated with greater rigidity than 
the non-moral avoidance prime).  Alternatively, and perhaps more likely based on past 
research findings (Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster, Friedman, Isen & Daubman, 1984; 
Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990; Özelsel & Denzler, 2006; Semin and Fiedler, 1988, 
1989), inhibition in general would produce greater rigidity; that is, both moral and non-
moral avoidance primes would be similarly associated with greater rigidity.  The domain 
(moral versus non-moral) differences for the approach/avoidance primes were viewed as 
an exploratory aspect of the current research. Based on past literature, we proposed to test 
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three predictions involving cognitive rigidity, approach/avoidance motivation, and 
political orientation. 
  The first prediction was based on associations between approach/avoidance 
orientation and cognitive rigidity.   Past work in cognitive psychology suggests an 
approach focus is associated with approach and greater cognitive flexibility, and an 
avoidance focus is associated with avoidance and greater cognitive rigidity (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster, Friedman, 
Özelsel & Denzler, 2006, Isen & Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990).  
Therefore we predicted there would be a main effect of approach/avoidance prime on 
cognitive rigidity.  Specifically, individuals who received an approach prime would 
report greater cognitive flexibility (i.e., greater inclusion on ambiguous items into a 
category) and individuals who received an avoidance prime would report greater 
cognitive rigidity (i.e., more frequent exclusion of ambiguous items from a category).  
The second prediction was based on associations between political orientation and 
cognitive rigidity.  Political orientation research suggests that uncertainty and threat 
underlie conservative ideology, and past research has found that conservatism is 
positively associated with cognitive rigidity (see, e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & 
Sulloway, 2003).  In the current research, we therefore expected conservatives to exhibit 
greater cognitive rigidity (i.e., more frequent exclusion of ambiguous items from a 
category) across both approach and avoidance primes compared to liberals.  
The final and most interesting prediction involved an interaction between 
approach/avoidance primes and political orientation.  More specifically, conservatives 
primed with an avoidance (but not approach) motivational prime would show the greatest 
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cognitive rigidity—more than conservatives in the approach-prime condition and more 
than liberals in either prime condition.  Past research supports links between both 
avoidance motivation and cognitive rigidity (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; 
Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel & Denzler, 2006, Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990), and between political conservatism 
and cognitive rigidity (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Further, recent 
research suggests an association between conservatism and avoidance motives (e.g., 
Janoff-Bulman et al., in press), a link also suggested by conservatives’ particular concern 
with managing uncertainty and threat (Jost et al., 2003).  Together these findings suggest 
a joint effect of conservatism and avoidance motivation on cognitive rigidity—greater 
rigidity by conservatives in the avoidance-prime condition. In other words, conservatives 
and liberals would not be expected to be equally sensitive to avoidance primes; 
conservatives would be expected to be more sensitive than liberals.  This prediction is 
consistent with Higgins’s (2006) work on regulatory fit.  Regulatory fit describes the 
experience of enhanced performance when there is a match between the method by which 
people pursue their goals and the goal orientation.  In the current context, greater 
cognitive rigidity would reflect “enhanced” inhibition, and to the extent that this occurs 
for conservatives in the avoidant-prime condition, it would support the view that 
conservatives are more likely to rely on an avoidant goal orientation.   
  Past research has focused almost exclusively on the conservatism-rigidity link, 
which raises the question of whether political liberalism would be associated with greater 
flexibility in the current research.  Further, as a corollary to our third prediction, we 
investigated whether liberals would demonstrate greatest flexibility (i.e., greatest 
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inclusion of ambiguous items) in the approach motivation condition, reflecting a possible 
“fit” between an approach goal orientation and the approach prime.  These relationships 
were also explored in the current research, but were regarded as largely exploratory.   
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants  
 Participants were 223 undergraduate psychology students (65 males, 158 females) 
who completed a questionnaire packet as members of the Psychology Department subject 
pool.  Participation was voluntary and students received experimental credit for their 
cooperation.     
Design and Procedure 
 The study was a 2 (domain: moral x non-moral prime) X 2 (motivation: approach 
x avoidance prime) design with an additional no-prime control.  Following the prime, 
participants completed a 60-item categorization task based on a list of category exemplars 
(Rosch, 1975), the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988) and a series of demographic questions, including four questions tapping 
political orientation.  
Materials  
Prime: Approach/Avoidance and Moral/Non-Moral.   Both motivational (i.e. 
approach/avoidance) and domain (moral/non-moral) primes asked participants to describe 
what one should approach (i.e., “What should you do?”) versus what one should avoid 
(i.e., “What shouldn’t you do?”) (see Appendix).  In the moral domain, the 
approach/avoidance prime focused on what one should do to be a moral person or what 
one should avoid so as to not be immoral.  The approach moral prime asked participants 
to generate 10 items that would produce a more moral person. The focus was on what one 
should do. The specific instructions were as follows:   
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We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong.  We are 
interested in your views.  What comes to mind when you think about what it 
means to be moral?  More specifically, what should you do if your goal is 
to be moral?  When we think about morality, we are basically considering 
ways we should act and the kind of people we should be.  In other words, 
we think about behaviors we should engage in, types of people we should 
be, things we should do.  With these perspectives in mind, please consider 
how to be moral by filling in the lines below. 
The avoidance moral prime asked participants to generate 10 items that would produce a 
person who is not immoral.  The focus was on what one should not do. The specific 
instructions were as follows: 
We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong.  We are 
interested in your views.  What comes to mind when you think about what it 
means to be immoral?  More specifically, what shouldn’t you do if your 
goal is not to be immoral?  When we think about avoiding immorality, we 
are basically considering ways we should not act and the kind of people 
we should not be.  In other words, we think about behaviors we should not 
engage in, types of people we should not be, things we should not do.  
With these perspectives in mind, please consider how not to be immoral by 
filling in the lines below. 
In the non-moral domain, the approach/avoidance prime focused on personal preferences, 
specifically entertainment recommendations.  In the non-moral approach prime, 
participants were asked to generate a list of 10 movies that would promote an enjoyable 
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entertainment experience.  The focus was on what one should do. The specific 
instructions were as follows: 
We each have our own way of enjoying our free time.  One popular way is 
watching movies at a theater or on DVD.  We are interested in your views 
about movies.  What films should be seen if your goal is to have an 
enjoyable experience?  In other words, if you want to guarantee the most 
satisfying and enjoyable movie-watching experience, which films should 
you be sure to see?  With these perspectives in mind, please consider the 
movies you should watch to have an enjoyable experience. 
The non-moral avoidance prime asked participants to generate 10 movies to avoid if one 
does not want to have an unenjoyable entertainment experience.  The focus was on what 
one should no do. The specific instructions were as follows: 
We each have our own way of enjoying our free time.  One popular way is 
watching movies at a theater or on DVD.  We are interested in your views 
about movies.  What films should not be watched if your goal is to avoid 
having an unenjoyable experience?  In other words, if you want to 
guarantee avoiding the least satisfying and least enjoyable movie-watching 
experience, which films should you be sure not to see?  With these 
perspectives in mind, please consider the movies you should not watch to 
avoid having an unenjoyable experience.   
In addition to these four conditions, a neutral, control condition was included.  This was a 
no-prime condition and therefore involved neither approach/avoidance nor moral/non-
moral manipulations.  Participants completed all study tasks and scales except the 
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priming measures.  This control group was included to provide a baseline against which 
direction of any significant effects could be tested.  
Categorization Task. Following the prime, participants completed a 60-item 
categorization task (see Appendix).  This measure was developed using prototypic, 
moderately prototypic and non-prototypic exemplars from Rosch’s Cognitive 
Representations of Semantic Categories (1975).  A complete list of exemplars and their 
prototypic ratings is appended (see Appendix).  For the categorization task participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which an item fits a category.  Participants rated 12 items 
within each of five categories (i.e., furniture, vehicle, weapon, clothing and carpenter 
tool).  The 12 items were further differentiated in terms of prototypicality for each 
category (e.g., prototypical, moderately prototypical, non-prototypical).  Using the 
vehicle category as an example, prototypic items included “car,” “bus,” “train,” and 
“airplane”; moderately prototypic items included “jet,” “tractor,” “yacht,” and “go-cart”; 
and non-prototypical included “blimp,” “camel,”  “wheelbarrow,” and “elevator.”  
Responses to the categorization task were made on 9-point Likert scales, anchored from 1 
(“not at all a good fit”) to 9 (“extremely good fit”).  Items were averaged within each 
level of prototypicality for goodness of fit rating (prototypic [a = .707], moderately 
prototypic [a = .755], and non-prototypic [a = .822]), with higher numbers representing 
greater category fit. 
Participants were also asked to make a discrete judgment about whether an item is 
or is not a member of the category (“yes” or “no”). This has not been used in past 
research, but seemed essential for making claims about categorization inclusion and 
exclusion.  Goodness of fit ratings alone would not provide a clear indication of whether 
  18 
an item was considered in or out of the category.  For total “no” decisions, items were 
counted within each level of prototypicality (prototypic [a = .764], moderately prototypic 
[a = .709], and non-prototypic [a = .693]), with high numbers (i.e., larger number of no’s) 
representing greater category exclusion and thus greater cognitive rigidity.  
Political Orientation.  Four items in the questionnaire measured political 
orientation (see Skitka et al, 2005).  Participants were asked to designate where they 
would place themselves on two 7-point Likert scales. One scale asked about 
liberalism/conservatism and had endpoints 1 (“Very Liberal”) and 7 (“Very 
Conservative”), and the asked about political party affiliation and had endpoints 1 
(“Strong Democrat”) and 7 (“Strong Republican”).  Participants were also asked, “How 
much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives?” and “How much do you tend 
to like or dislike political liberals?”  Participants responded on 7-point Likert scales 
anchored at 1 (“dislike extremely”) and 7 (“like extremely”).  These four items were 
highly correlated and were combined (after reverse-scoring the item about 
disliking/liking liberals) to provide a single measure of Political Orientation (a = .759), 
with higher numbers indicating greater political conservatism. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Participants completed the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) following 
the priming and categorization tasks.  For the PANAS, participants rated the extent to 
which they felt each of 20 feelings and emotions (e.g., afraid, determined, nervous, 
excited).  Surprisingly, the emotions “happy” and “sad” were not included in the original 
scale, so they were added to our list emotions to create a total of 11 positive emotions and 
11 negative emotions.  Both subscales of emotion were highly reliable: Positive Emotion 
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(a = .911) and Negative Emotion (a = .873); reliabilities did not differ when “happy” and 
“sad” were included. Analyses were conducted using these 1—item emotion scales; when 
re-run with the original 10-item scales, results remained unchanged.  Finally, participants 
were also asked demographic information including age, sex, race and religious 
affiliation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Approach/Avoidance and Moral/Non-Moral Domain 
Table 1 provides means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between 
the major measures in the study.  Across conditions, Positive and Negative Emotions 
were not correlated with any outcome measure.  
We performed a series of 2 (domain: moral/non-moral) x 2 (motivation: 
approach/avoidance) ANOVAs on the three levels of prototypicality (prototypic, 
moderately prototypic and non-prototypic) for total “no” decisions and goodness of fit 
ratings (see Table 2 for mean scores).  For total “no” decisions a significant main effect 
for approach/avoidance prime emerged for moderately prototypic items (F[2,220] = 
14.61, p <.001), but no differences were found for prototypic (F[2,220] = .225, p = n.s.) 
and non-prototypic items (F[2,220] = 2.71, p = n.s.).  For category fit ratings a significant 
main effect for approach/avoidance prime emerged for moderately prototypic items 
(F[2,220] = 11.77, p <.001), but no differences were found for prototypic items (F(2,220) 
= .758, p = ns).  A significant main effect for approach/avoidance prime was also found 
for non-prototypic items (F[2,220] = 6.55, p <.01), but again the discrete judgment of 
non-prototypic items did not differ based on prime. Across analyses, no differences 
emerged for domain (moral versus non-moral); differences emerged only for approach 
versus avoidance primes.  Category inclusion/exclusion judgments (“no” decisions) 
differed only for the moderately prototypical items, the most ambiguous items, and were 
supported by significant differences in goodness of fit ratings.  
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We conducted a one-way ANOVA including the no-prime control condition to 
determine whether approach, avoidance or both primes were causing the differences in 
categorization for moderately prototypic items (see Table 3 for mean scores).   For total 
“no” decisions, results showed significant differences across the three groups (F[2,220] = 
8.45,  p<.001), and post hoc analyses revealed that the avoidance prime (M = 3.78) was 
significantly different from both the approach (M = 2.41) and no prime conditions (M = 
2.71).  The three prime conditions for category fit also significantly differed (F[2,220] = 
6.04, p<.01 ); in this case post hoc analyses showed that the approach and avoidance 
primes significantly differed from each other, but neither differed from the control (see 
Table 3).  
Political Orientation  
There were no significant correlations between political orientation and any of the 
measures of cognitive rigidity (see Table 1).  Analyses were conducted to explore the 
main effects and possible interactions of approach/avoidance prime and political 
orientation on cognitive rigidity.  Multiple regression analyses included moral/non-moral 
and approach/avoidance primes, as well as political orientation and their interaction terms 
to predict cognitive rigidity (i.e., total “no” decisions and goodness of fit ratings of 
moderately prototypic items).  No significant main effects or interactions were found for 
the prototypic or non-prototypic items.  Again, however, significant differences emerged 
for the moderately prototypic items.  As shown in Table 4, for total “no” decisions of 
category group membership, political orientation and approach/avoidance prime 
significantly interacted to predict cognitive rigidity (bprime x pol = -.439, SEb = .142, p 
<.01).  Similarly, as shown in Table 5, for goodness of fit ratings the interaction between 
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approach/avoidance prime and political orientation significantly predicted cognitive 
rigidity for moderately prototypic items (bprime x pol = -.40, SEb = .137, p<.05).  As can 
be seen in Figures 1 and 2, across analyses relatively high levels of conservatism were 
associated with more cognitive rigidity, but only when exposed to the avoidance prime.   
In subsequent analyses we included a 3-way interaction term of moral/non-moral 
prime, approach/avoidance prime and political orientation in a trimmed regression model 
to test for a possible 3-way interaction with political orientation (see Table 6 & 7).  The 
interaction term between approach/avoidance and political orientation remained 
significant for both total “no” decisions (bprime x pol = .807, SEb = .373, p <.05) and for 
category fit ratings (bprime x pol = -.400, SEb = .137, p < .005), and the 3-way 
interaction term for both analyses was not significant.  In addition, we re-ran the full-
model analyses to control for possible effects of Positive and Negative Emotions.  
Positive and Negative Emotions were entered at Step 1 in a hierarchical regression 
analyses.  Results were the same; the interaction term between approach/avoidance and 
political orientation remained significant.   
Comparison to No Prime Condition 
To get a better sense of the direction of effects we conducted hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses that included the control condition (i.e., no-prime) as a comparison 
group. In separate analyses, Positive Emotions and Negative Emotions were included in 
the Step 1 to account for some of the error variance that might be due to the conceptually 
dissimilar control condition.  Step two included prime, political orientation and their 
interaction terms to predict total “no” decisions for moderately prototypic items (see 
Tables 8 & 9).  Results revealed that the association between political orientation and 
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cognitive rigidity were significantly stronger for the avoidance prime relative to the 
approach (bavoidance x pol = .907, SEb = .368, p= <.05; see Table 8) and neutral primes 
(bapproach x pol = .798, SEb = .417, p< .06; see Table 9).  Specifically, higher levels of 
conservatism were associated with more total “no” decisions but only when exposed to 
the avoidance prime relative to either approach or control primes.  Figure 3 graphically 
presents these effects. 
We used equivalent methods to test the direction of effects of predicting goodness 
of fit ratings for moderately prototypic items (see Tables 10 & 11).  Again, emotions 
were included in step one to control for possible error variance.  Step two included prime, 
political orientation and their interactions to predict goodness of fit ratings for moderately 
prototypic items.  Identical patterns emerged such that higher levels of conservatism were 
associated with lower goodness of fit ratings but only when exposed to the avoidance 
prime relative to the approach (bavoidance x pol = -.418, SEb = .139, p <.005) and 
control conditions (bavoidance x pol = -.279, SEb = .157, p <.08).  As graphically shown 
in Figure 4, greater conservatism was associated with lower goodness of fit ratings in the 
avoidance condition relative to the approach and control conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
For both total “no” decisions and category goodness of fit ratings a significant 
main effect for approach/avoidance prime emerged for moderately prototypic items, but 
no differences were found for prototypic and non-prototypic items.  More specifically, 
approach/avoidance conditions significantly differed, and the avoidance condition was 
associated with greater cognitive rigidity than the approach condition; the avoidance 
condition also differed from a no-prime control.  This finding supports past work 
associating avoidance motivation with greater cognitive rigidity (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, 
& Berntson, 1993; Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel & Denzler, 
2006, Isen & Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990).  Our behavioral 
measure of cognitive rigidity, which differed from other forms of rigidity measures, 
yielded conceptually similar results to past research.  The approach and no-prime control 
conditions did not differ, suggesting not only that people generally tend to be relatively 
flexible, but that in the absence of any treatment, people tend to be similar to those with 
an approach orientation (see, e.g., Myers & Diener, 1995). 
Across analyses, significant results were found for the moderately prototypic 
object items and not the prototypic or non-prototypic categories.  This finding is logical 
given that both the prototypic and the non-prototypic items were perceived as fairly 
homogenous, in that either all items fit the category (prototypic) or they did not (non-
prototypic).  It was the items that were perceived as most ambiguous (moderately 
prototypic) that produced the most room for movement.  
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We did not find support for our second prediction; there was no main effect of 
political orientation on cognitive rigidity, and political orientation was not significantly 
correlated with any outcome measure.  However, the research supported our third 
prediction, in that analyses   yielded an interesting interaction effect for political 
orientation and approach/avoidance prime in producing cognitive rigidity.  For both total 
“no” decisions and category goodness of fit ratings, political orientation and 
approach/avoidance prime significantly interacted to predict cognitive rigidity for 
moderately prototypic items.  More specifically, conservatives primed with an avoidance 
(but not approach) motivational prime showed the greatest cognitive rigidity—more than 
conservatives in the approach-prime condition, more than liberals in either prime 
condition, and more than those in the no-prime condition.  The finding that conservatives 
in the avoidance conditions exhibited the greatest cognitive rigidity seems to provide 
evidence for a differential sensitivity of conservatives to an avoidance orientation 
compared to liberals.   
Overall, the results suggest that approach/avoidance motivation moderates the 
relationship between political orientation and cognitive rigidity, and specifically, political 
conservatism and cognitive rigidity, a finding consistent with Higgins’s (Förster & 
Higgins, 2005) work on regulatory fit.  Interestingly, a review of research on 
authoritarianism, a concept related to both rigidity and political orientation, has found a 
similar pattern of results. Christie (1993) found that 9 studies measuring both cognitive 
rigidity and authoritarianism yielded inconsistent findings across the studies.  He 
proposed that the experimental conditions may be responsible for the relationship 
between the two concepts.  Specifically, he believed that studies that measured rigidity 
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under stressful (ego-involving) situations showed a positive relationship between 
authoritarianism and rigidity, whereas this relationship disappeared when rigidity was 
measured under neutral (relaxed) conditions.  These results suggest that rigidity may not 
be a general disposition, but rather a joint product of an individual’s sensitivity and the 
environment.  Similarly, in the current research, conservatives primed with an avoidance 
orientation showed the greatest cognitive rigidity.  It is not that the conservatives were 
more rigid in general; rather their greater sensitivity to negative outcomes appeared to 
lead them to make greater use of avoidance-based inhibition strategies (i.e., cognitive 
rigidity) when subjected to an avoidance prime.   
Our findings for liberals revealed no main effects of approach or avoidance 
primes.  That is, liberals primed with an approach orientation did not exhibit greater 
cognitive flexibility nor did they respond with greater cognitive rigidity when primed 
with an avoidance orientation.  Additionally, liberals did not differ from the no-prime 
control group on cognitive rigidity.  The lack of results for political liberals might be due 
to already high levels of flexibility and therefore the approach prime did not make a 
difference.  Additionally, liberals may not have been as affected by the avoidance primes 
because they do not share the same sensitivity to negative outcomes (i.e., uncertainty and 
threat) as conservatives and therefore didn’t need to use the avoidance strategies (greater 
inhibition and therefore greater rigidity) to manage these concerns.   
 Given that moral beliefs and values generally underlie political orientation, we 
were interested in whether inhibition in the moral domain in particular would produce 
greater rigidity (i.e., whether the moral avoidance prime would be more associated with 
greater rigidity than the non-moral avoidance prime).  Alternatively and perhaps more 
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likely based on past research findings (Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster, Friedman, Isen 
& Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990; Özelsel & Denzler, 2006; Semin 
and Fiedler, 1988, 1989), inhibition in general would produce greater rigidity; that is, 
both moral and non-moral avoidance primes would be similarly associated with greater 
rigidity.  Our results found support for the latter prediction.  Political conservatives 
exhibited a generalized sensitivity to an avoidance orientation, regardless of domain.  
Conservatives’ avoidance-based motives in the moral domain (see Janoff-Bulman et al., 
in press) are therefore likely a reflection of a more general orientation involving 
sensitivity to negative outcomes and avoidance strategies.  
 A limitation of the present research is that it relied upon responses from college-
aged students and not a representative sample from the public.  However, because we 
investigated basic psychological processes (e.g., cognitive categorization and 
motivation), the sample should not have affected our results.  Furthermore, despite the 
high prevalence of political liberals on campus we were able to get a good range and 
representation of political views.  Nevertheless, in future replications of this research we 
will explore options for getting more representative non-student samples (e.g., National 
Science Foundations’ Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences [TESS]).   
 The present study focused solely on cognitive rigidity and used a single 
categorization task to assess cognitive rigidity.  Future experiments will explore the use 
of multiple measures of cognitive rigidity.  The strength of the measure used in this 
research is that it involved a behavioral task--categorization--and not just self-report 
assessments of cognitive rigidity (e.g., Budner, 1962; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 
1993; McCrae, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1996; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  Additionally, 
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the design of our task included two different measures of cognitive rigidity (goodness of 
fit ratings and discrete category judgments).  Past research on categorization has typically 
relied on only goodness of fit ratings (see, e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer, 
Kedem & Paz, 1990).  We believe that the discrete judgments added valuable information 
about the categorization process, for there was a measure of actual categorization (“yes” 
or “no,” indicating in or out of the category) and not simply ratings of fit.  Using both 
goodness of fit ratings and discrete category judgments allowed us to collect two 
different and internally consistent indices of cognitive rigidity for each participant.   
 Our predicted future directions include replicating the findings from the current 
study with non-student samples and exploring the relationships among rigidity, political 
orientation and approach/avoidance by focusing more specifically on the role of threat 
and uncertainty.  In addition we plan to extend our work from the object based 
categorization task to measure cognitive rigidity in terms of social categorization.  We 
believe the basic processes explored in this project can be applied to the social 
categorization process in an effort to better understand stereotyping and prejudice.   
For example, recent social psychological research has found that when evaluating the 
national category of “American” there was a bias in the racial group that was included in 
the category.   Specifically, implicit measures of attitudes revealed that White Americans 
were associated with more “American” qualities than ethnic minorities (Devos & Banaji, 
2005).  America is an immigrant nation and its citizens are made up of many other 
ethnicities outside of European descent, but this research shows how individuals rely on 
prototype judgments when determining social group membership.  We are interested in 
exploring the relationships among approach/avoidance motivation, political orientation 
  29 
and social categorization.  Do conservatives construct narrower social categories when 
primed with an avoidance orientation?  Further, perhaps political conservatives rely more 
on prototype judgments whereas political liberals utilize exemplars when deciding 
individual membership in a social category.  An extension of this research to social 
categories may provide insights into some real world implications of the associations 
among approach/avoidance, political orientation and cognitive rigidity. 
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M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Political Orientation 3.29 .99 -
2. Positive Emotion 2.70 .87 .03 -
3. Negative Emotion 1.49 .58 -.09 .10 -
4. Non-Prot. Ratings 3.93 1.11 -.05 .04 .04 -
5. Mod, Prot. Ratings 7.38 .91 -.05 -.02 .01 .51 -
6. High Prot. Ratings 8.67 .37 -.04 -.02 -.03 .26 .66 -
7. Non-Prot. No’s 14.9 3.53 .00 -.08 -.02 -.62 -.34 -.20 -
8. Mod. Prot. No’s 3.21 2.42 .09 .04 .04 -.32 -.62 -.38 .46 -
9. High Prot. No’s .45 1.05 .02 .11 .06 -.17 -.32 -.58 .15 .46
Table 1.  Bivariate Correlations for Predictor and Outcome Variables. 
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Table 2.  Means for Prototypic, Moderately Prototypic, and Non-prototypic as a 
Function of Approach/Avoidance Prime. 
  
 
 
 
Prototypic 
Moderately 
Prototypic Non-prototypic 
 
No’s 
Category 
Fit No’s 
Category 
Fit No’s 
Category 
Fit 
Approach .356 8.70 2.34 7.69 13.95 4.10 
Avoidance .564 8.66 3.90 7.33 15.00 3.71 
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Table 3.  Means and Standard Deviations for Moderately Prototypical Objects by 
Approach/avoidance Prime. 
 
 Number of No’s Goodness of Fit Ratings 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Approach 2.41 2.02 7.70 .84 
Avoidance 3.78 2.67 7.24 .91 
Control 2.71 1.92 7.45 .81 
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Table 4.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Total “No” 
Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items. 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
(Constant) 6.816 1.201  .000 
Moral -.453 .583 -.251 .438 
Approach/Avoidance .876 .665 .484 .190 
Political Orientation .399 .287 .417 .166 
Moral x 
Approach/Avoidance 
.057 .265 .070 .829 
Moral x Political 
Orientation 
.156 .142 .359 .271 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation 
-.439 .142 -1.136 .002 
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Table 5.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Goodness of 
Fit Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items. 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
(Constant) 6.816 1.201  .000 
Moral -.453 .583 -.251 .438 
Approach/Avoidance .876 .665 .484 .190 
Political Orientation .399 .287 .417 .166 
Moral x 
Approach/Avoidance 
.057 .265 .070 .829 
Moral x Political 
Orientation 
.156 .142 .359 .271 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation 
-.439 .142 -1.136 .002 
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Table 6.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Total “No” 
Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of Approach/avoidance and 
Political Orientation. 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
(Constant) 1.018 .567  .075 
Approach/Avoidance 1.367 .353 .277 .000 
Political Orientation -.968 .603 -.371 .110 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation 
.807 .373 .498 .032 
Morality x 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation 
.006 .064 .011 .922 
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Table 7.  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Goodness of 
Fit Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of Approach/avoidance and 
Political Orientation. 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
(Constant) 8.192 .209  .000 
Approach/Avoidance -.470 .130 -.259 .000 
Political Orientation .565 .222 .589 .012 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation 
-.400 .137 -.671 .004 
Morality x 
Approach/Avoidance x 
Political Orientation  
.033 .023 .163 .162 
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Table 8. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Total “No” 
Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of Approach/Avoidance and 
Neutral Conditions with Political Orientation. 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
Step 1     
     Positive Emotion .115 .180 .043 .522 
     Negative Emotion .142 .272 .035 .602 
Step 2     
    Positive Emotion .196 .174 .074 .261 
    Negative Emotion .246 .263 .061 .350 
    Avoidance 1.379 .343 .287 .000 
    Neutral .320 .442 .053 .469 
    Political Orientation -.202 .267 -.083 .450 
    Political Orientation x 
Avoidance 
-.907 .368 .236 .015 
    Political Orientation x 
Neutral 
.108 .428 .021 .800 
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Table 9. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Total “No” 
Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of Approach/Avoidance and 
Neutral Conditions with Political Orientation 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
Step 1     
     Positive Emotion .115 .180 .043 .522 
     Negative Emotion .142 .272 .035 .602 
Step 2     
    Positive Emotion .196 .174 .074 .261 
    Negative Emotion .246 .263 .061 .350 
    Approach -.320 .442 -.066 .469 
    Avoidance 1.059 .435 .220 .016 
    Political Orientation -.094 .334 -.039 .779 
    Political Orientation x 
Approach 
-.108 .428 -.027 .800 
    Political Orientation x 
Avoidance 
.798 .417 .208 .057 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 10. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Dummy Coded Variables 
Predicting Goodness of Fit Category Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items as a 
Function of Approach/Avoidance and Neutral Conditions with Political Orientation 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
Step 1     
     Positive Emotion -.017 .067 -.017 .804 
     Negative Emotion .010 .102 .007 .918 
Step 2     
    Positive Emotion -.048 .066 -.049 .463 
    Negative Emotion -.022 .099 -.015 .826 
    Avoidance -.473 .129 -.264 .000 
    Neutral -.277 .167 -.122 .098 
    Political Orientation .175 .101 .192 .084 
    Political Orientation x 
Avoidance 
-.418 .139 -.292 .003 
    Political Orientation x 
Neutral 
-.139 .162 -.074 .389 
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Table 11. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Goodness of Fit 
Category Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of Approach/Avoidance 
and Neutral Conditions with Political Orientation 
 
Variable B SE B β p 
Step 1     
     Positive Emotion -.017 .067 -.017 .804 
     Negative Emotion .010 .102 .007 .918 
Step 2     
    Positive Emotion -.048 .066 -.049 .463 
    Negative Emotion -.022 .099 -.015 .826 
    Approach .277 .167 .152 .098 
    Avoidance -.197 .164 -.110 .232 
    Political Orientation .036 .126 .039 .778 
    Political Orientation x 
Approach 
.139 .162 .092 .389 
    Political Orientation x 
Avoidance 
-.279 .157 -.195 .078 
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Figure 1. Total “No “Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of 
Political Orientation and Approach/Avoidance Conditions. 
 
Note: Higher numbers represent more category exclusion 
 
  
Figure 2. Goodness of Fit Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of 
Political Orientation and Approach/Avoidance Conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Lower numbers represent more category exclusion 
  43 
Figure 3. Total “No” Decisions for Moderately Prototypic Items as a Function of 
Political Orientation and Approach/Avoidance/ and Neutral Conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Higher numbers represent more category exclusion 
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Figure 4. Predicting Goodness of Fit Ratings for Moderately Prototypic Items as a 
Function of Political Orientation and Approach/Avoidance and Neutral Conditions. 
 
 
  
Note: Lower numbers represent more category exclusion
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APPENDIX 
MATERIALS 
 
I. Moral approach prime 
 
We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong.  We are interested in your 
views.  What comes to mind when you think about what it means to be moral?  More 
specifically, what should you do if your goal is to be moral?  When we think about 
morality, we are basically considering ways we should act and the kind of people we 
should be.  In other words, we think about behaviors we should engage in, types of 
people we should be, things we should do.  With these perspectives in mind, please 
consider how to be moral by filling in the lines below.  (Please use the format below and 
fill in as many lines as you can.) 
 
 
TO BE MORAL: 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
 
I should _____________________________________________________________ 
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II. Moral avoidance prime 
 
We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong.  We are interested in your 
views.  What comes to mind when you think about what it means to be immoral?  More 
specifically, what shouldn’t you do if your goal is not to be immoral?  When we think 
about avoiding immorality, we are basically considering ways we should not act and 
the kind of people we should not be.  In other words, we think about behaviors we 
should not engage in, types of people we should not be, things we should not do.  With 
these perspectives in mind, please consider how not to be immoral by filling in the lines 
below.  (Please use the format below and fill in as many lines as you can.) 
 
 
 
TO NOT BE IMMORAL: 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should not __________________________________________________________ 
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III. Non-moral approach prime 
 
We each have our own way of enjoying our free time.  One popular way is watching 
movies at a theater or on DVD.  We are interested in your views about movies.  What 
films should be seen if your goal is to have an enjoyable experience?  In other words, if 
you want to guarantee the most satisfying and enjoyable movie-watching experience, 
which films should you be sure to see?  With these perspectives in mind, please consider 
the movies you should watch to have an enjoyable experience.  (Please use the format 
below and fill in as many lines as you can.) 
 
 
 
 
TO HAVE AN ENJOYABLE MOVIE-GOING EXPERIENCE: 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
 
I should see __________________________________________________________ 
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IV. Non-moral avoidance prime 
 
We each have our own way of enjoying our free time.  One popular way is watching 
movies at a theater or on DVD.  We are interested in your views about movies.  What 
films should not be watched if your goal is to avoid having an unenjoyable experience?  
In other words, if you want to guarantee avoiding the least satisfying and least enjoyable 
movie-watching experience, which films should you be sure not to see?  With these 
perspectives in mind, please consider the movies you should not watch to avoid having 
an unenjoyable experience.  (Please use the format below and fill in as many lines as 
you can.) 
 
 
 
TO AVOID AN UNENJOYABLE MOVIE-GOING EXPERIENCE: 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
 
I should not watch _______________________________________________________ 
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Categorization Task 
 
Listed below are a number of common categories, followed by items that differ in the 
degree to which they do or do not fit the category. 
For each item, use the scales below to indicate the degree to which you believe the item 
fits the category.  Then indicate (by checking one of the two spaces provided) whether 
you believe the item is or is not a member of the category. 
 
 
FURNITURE 
  
not at all               extremely          category  
a good fit                  good fit         member  
 
chair       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
drapes      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
footstool   1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
desk      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
sofa      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
ashtray    1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
lamp      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
fan      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
telephone 1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bookcase  1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bed       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bench      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
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VEHICLE 
 
not at all               extremely         category  
a good fit                  good fit        member 
 
car     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
jet     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
    
camel       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
yacht      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
train      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
go-cart     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
blimp      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
  
tractor     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bus      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
elevator    1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
airplane   1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
 wheel-      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
barrow 
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WEAPON 
 
not at all               extremely         category  
a good fit                  good fit        member 
 
knife      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
arrow       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
ice pick     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
foot       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bomb       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bricks       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
gun       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
 brass-        1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no  
knuckles  
   
shoes         1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
axe             1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
sword       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
screw-       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
driver 
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CLOTHING  
 
not at all               extremely         category  
a good fit                  good fit        member 
 
shirt      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
cane         1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
 bathing    1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
suit 
 
purse      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
sweater    1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
vest          1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
ring      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
pants      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bracelet   1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
pajamas  1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bathrobe 1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
jacket      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
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CARPENTER TOOLS  
 
not at all               extremely         category  
a good fit                  good fit        member  
 
drill      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
ladder      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
cement     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
bolts      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
saw      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
hammer   1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
rags       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
scissors     1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
hatchet      1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
 screw-       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
driver 
 
blueprints 1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
 
hinge       1        2         3       4        5        6        7        8         9  _____yes    ____ no 
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Exemplar Ratings from Rosch’s Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories 
(1975) 
 
Category: FURNITURE 
High Medium Low 
chair (1.04) bookcase (2.15) drapes (5.67) 
sofa (1.04) footstool (2.45) ashtray (6.35) 
desk (1.54) lamp (2.94) fan (6.49) 
bed (1.58) bench (2.77) telephone (6.68) 
 
 
Category: VEHICLE 
High Medium Low 
car (1.24) jet (2.79) blimp (4.81) 
bus (1.27) tractor (3.30) camel (5.22) 
train (2.15) yacht (3.76) wheelbarrow (5.72) 
airplane (2.64) go-cart (3.85) elevator (5.90) 
 
 
Category: WEAPON 
High Medium Low 
gun (1.03) brass knuckles (2.38) bricks (4.64) 
knife (1.40) arrow (2.66) foot (5.23) 
sword (1.47) ice pick (3.14) screwdriver (5.40) 
bomb (1.67) axe (3.34) shoes (6.23) 
 
 
Category: CLOTHING 
High Medium Low 
pants (1.12) pajamas (2.25) purse (5.92) 
shirt (1.14) bathing suit (2.44) ring (6.11) 
jacket (1.68) bathrobe (2.65) bracelet (6.24) 
sweater (1.89) vest (2.81) cane (6.25) 
 
 
Category: CARPENTER TOOLS 
High Medium Low 
saw (1.04) ladder (2.64) cement (4.91) 
hammer (1.34) blueprints (2.90) hatchet (5.15) 
screwdriver (1.56) hinge (3.12) rags (5.20) 
drill (1.59) bolts (3.63) scissors (5.36) 
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I. Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS;Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions.  Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word.  Indicate to what extent you now feel each of the following.  Use the following 
scale below to record your answers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______ afraid    _______ active 
_______ determined    _______ scared 
_______ nervous    _______ enthusiastic 
_______ excited    _______ inspired 
_______ irritable    _______ upset 
_______ proud    _______ interested 
_______ guilty    _______ alert 
_______ ashamed    _______ jittery 
_______ attentive    _______ strong 
_______ distressed    _______ hostile 
1 
not at all 
2 
a little 
5 
extremely 
4 
quite a bit 
3 
moderately 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Gender: ___male    ___female 
 
Age: ____               Class year:  ___freshman   ___sophomore   ___junior   ___senior 
 
Race/Ethnicity:  ___Black   ___Latino/Hispanic   ___Asian   ___White   ___Other   
 
Religion:  ___Catholic   ___Evangelical Christian   ___Protestant    
                 ___Jewish   ___Muslim   ___Buddhist   ___Other 
 
To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? 
  not at all                                                                                                              extremely 
  religious                   religious 
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
How important a role does religion play in your life? 
not at all                                                                                                              extremely 
important               important 
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
      
Where would you place yourself politically on the following two scales?   
     very                                                   neither                                                     very 
    liberal                                                                                 conservative   
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
    strong                                neither                                                   
strong  
   Democrat                                   Republican  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
 
How much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives? 
dislike extremely           like extremely  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
How much do you tend to like or dislike political liberals? 
dislike extremely           like extremely  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
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